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1. INTRODUCTION
 Civil conflicts create a “conflict  trap”. They  perpetuate themselves by destroying economic 
and social development, and by crippling political institutions rendering them unable to address the 
underlying grievances 1 . In this article, we empirically demonstrate that ethnic conflicts lead to 
another very  important political change which we argue, should be considered among the self-
perpetuating dynamics of these conflicts. We study  the Turkish case to show how an ethnic conflict 
creates a polarization trap by feeding the political polarization of the society  along ethnic 
nationalist lines. 
 Turkey offers a very important opportunity to study how ethnic conflicts affect political 
behavior in host societies. Since August 1984, the country has been suffering from an ethnic 
insurgency campaign led by the Kurdish separatist guerilla organization Kurdistan Workers' Party 
(Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan), the PKK. Despite the persistent political violence the electoral 
process has continued to unfold in a context of democratic elections, and in a political arena which 
hosts extreme ethnic-nationalist parties. The existence of Kurdish and Turkish ethnic nationalist 
parties in the political arena enables us to specifically test the effects of the ethnic conflict  on the 
political salience of ethnic issues and on the political salience of ethnic identities themselves 
because these parties are by definition champions of the particular interests of their ethnic brethren2. 
In this study, relying on a unique casualty database that we have assembled, we analyze the 
association between the conflict and the vote shares of these ethnic nationalist parties in the 1995 
and 1999 general elections. The results reveal a significant positive association between the conflict 
and both the Turkish-nationalist and Kurdish-nationalist vote shares, and thus, point to an ethnic-
nationalist polarization of the electorate. Given the completely opposing views these ethnic parties 
hold in terms of the conflict and the ways to solve it, the polarization result is telling in terms of 
how an ethnic conflict perpetuates itself and remains unresolved for almost three decades. 
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 We then argue that these results also tie to the constructivist argument that ethnic groups are 
fluid and endogenous to a set of social, economic, and political processes, and that individuals have 
multiple identities whose salience changes over time in response to their environment3. We refer to 
the ecological inference method developed by King (1997) to infer ethnic Kurdish and ethnic 
Turkish vote choices from aggregate election results4. Then we analyze how the ethnic conflict is 
associated with these estimated ethnic votes. The results reveal the significant positive association 
the conflict has with both ethnic Kurdish votes for the Kurdish-nationalist party, and ethnic Turkish 
votes for the Turkish-nationalist party, and thus, indicate that  in response to ethnic political violence 
voters attach more political salience to their ethnic identities in their vote choices.
 Our study is closely  linked to some recent works which have provided some clues about the 
type of the association between ethnic conflicts and electoral choice. In their studies on the 
Palestinian conflict  both Gould and Klor, and Berrebi and Klor find a positive association between 
the attacks and the vote share of the intransigent right-wing parties in Israel5. Kibris reaches a 
similar conclusion for the Turkish case6. These studies are of utmost importance because they  tell us 
about how people react  to violent conflict, and understanding people’s reactions is crucial if we are 
to figure out the dynamics of these conflicts. Nevertheless, we argue that  they provide us with only 
a partial understanding because they  implicitly assume a structure in which a homogenous society  is 
exposed to violence from a single outside source. Ethnic conflicts bid ethnic groups in a society 
against each other both politically and economically. In most cases civilians are exposed to violence 
from both the rebels and the state. Consequently, it is difficult to talk about a single unifying threat 
perception in ethnic conflicts. Moreover, ethnic conflicts activate ethnic identities in a society  rather 
than a common national one, and raise the salience of ethnic issues. Therefore, we expect the 
association between ethnic conflicts and voting behavior to vary among different groups, and in that 
sense deepen and maybe even increase the number of cleavages in a society. Our results support our 
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expectation, and demonstrate that the association manifests itself as an array of different effects 
which can not be subsumed under a turn towards the right wing. It seems, rather than unifying the 
the society behind a certain ideology as suggested by the above mentioned previous studies7, the 
conflict further fragments and polarizes the society behind opposing camps8. This more 
comprehensive approach to the association between ethnic conlicts and vote choice is one of the 
main contributions of our study to the literature.
Also important is the construction of the data set on security force causalties (SFCs). This is 
the first empirical study to look into the association between the ongoing ethnic conflict and the 
electoral fortunes of ethnic parties in Turkey. The dearth of studies acknowledging this association 
was not due to the lack of importance or relevance of the issue but was rather due to lack of data on 
which to build credible measures of the conflict. Our data set provides the first, and so far the only 
detailed information on casualties. Relying on this data set, it is possible to measure the variation in 
conflict intensity across time and locations. 
Finally, this study contributes to the literature by offering a preliminary empirical test of the 
constructivist arguments about the positive association between ethnic conflicts and the political 
salience of ethnic identity. This is an association that carries great importance for the study of ethnic 
conflicts. Nevertheless, it evades empirical study in most cases due to difficulties associated with 
simultaneous availability of data on ethnic identity and political behavior.
 In the following section, we present a brief overview of the ethnic conflict in Turkey. Then 
we discuss the theoretical foundations of our study. In the fourth section, we present our model and 
introduce our variables. The fifth section discusses the data. We present our results in the sixth, 
conduct robustness tests in the seventh section. Finally, we conclude in section eight.
3
2. THE CONFLICT IN TURKEY
 Ethnic Kurds are the largest ethnic minority  in Turkey. A recent survey study puts their 
percentage in the population to around 16%9. Historically, the Turkish state’s ethnic policy has 
consisted of the assimilation of the Kurdish speaking population under the rubric of the Turkish 
nation and consequently, this large minority has been denied the rights to self expression in the 
public sphere10. Saatci suggests that this dominant and homogenizing Turkish nationalism has in 
return produced the PKK11.
 The PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan) is a Kurdish separatist guerilla organization that has 
been conducting armed attacks in Turkey since August 1984. The organization was first founded 
with the goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, though by late 
1999, it appeared to roll back on its goal to a federational structure that  would grant more autonomy 
to the Kurdish population in Turkey. 
 The armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish security forces has been 
geographically concentrated in southeastern and eastern Turkey which is an underdeveloped part of 
the country, and which has traditionally  been inhabited by ethnic Kurds. While both sides mainly 
targeted each other’s forces and facilities, they have also employed repressive tactics against the 
civilian populations. The PKK conducted attacks against public servants like teachers, clergymen, 
administrative officers, and against civilians whom they accused of being “collaborators with the 
Turkish Republic”. Also, as a result  of the “village guards” system under which the state employed 
civilian villagers as armed guards against the insurgents, there were numerous incidents where the 
PKK attacked these guards and their villages. On the other hand, the Turkish state’s responses 
included the legal persecution and intolerance of Kurdish political demands, and a more sinister 
counterinsurgency campaign that involved extrajudicial killings in the 90s12. Interrupted by short 
lived cease-fires the armed conflict between the Turkish security forces and the PKK has been 
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going on for almost thirty years now. It has cost the country billions of dollars, and more than 40 
thousand lives13. Our knowledge about civilian and insurgent casualties is limited to aggregate 
numbers sporadically  released by contending sources as there is no credible and publicly  available 
dataset on them. Nevertheless, this study, provides us with a unique database on security force (i.e. 
soldiers and police officers) casualties (SFCs). 
 As can be clearly  seen in Chart 1 below which depicts the total number of SFCs over the 
years, the 90s has been the most bloody period of the conflict. The PKK received a major blow 
when its leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Africa in 1999, brought back to Turkey, tried and 
sentenced to life in prison. Headless and divided, the PKK ceased its attacks in the early 2000s. 
Unfortunately, peace in the area did not last long. The PKK resumed its armed attacks in the second 
half of 2004.
 Since the early 90s, the conflict has been considered by the political elite and the public as 
one of the most important  problems facing the country 14, and the ethnic based nationalist  cleavage 
contrasting the Turkish and Kurdish identities has become one of the most dominant cleavages of 
the ideological competition in the Turkish party system15 with two ethnic nationalist parties, one on 
the Turkish and one on the Kurdish side, as the flagbearers of this competition. 
 The MHP (Nationalist  Movement Party) is an extreme Turkish-nationalist party with the 
0
375
750
1125
1500
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
Chart 1: Total Number of Security Force Casualties
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most uncompromising, militarist  position towards the Kurdish issue. The party has never 
acknowledged a separate Kurdish ethnic identity16, and consequently  defined the problem as one of 
terrorism supported by foreign governments. Party  officials have always supported military 
solutions to the conflict, accused those who advocated granting political rights and freedoms to the 
Kurdish minority with attempting to disintegrate the country, and threatened to spill blood to 
prevent any kind of political concessions17.  
 HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) was a Kurdish-nationalist political party founded to 
take up the Kurdish cause and work for a political solution, after its predecessors HEP and DEP 
were closed down by the Constitutional Court. HEP (People’s Labor Party) was the first pro-
Kurdish party in Turkey. It was formed in 1990, but due to some legal constraints, could not  enter 
the 1991 general election. Instead 22 HEP members joined the left-wing Socialist People’s Party 
(SHP) and were voted into the parliament within the party  lists of SHP18. During its brief lifespan, 
HEP criticized the policy of the Turkish state against  the Kurdish minority, stating that the Kurdish 
issue could not be reduced to a terrorism problem, and insisted that a political solution was urgently 
needed. It condemned the military option and stressed that the PKK was not a terrorist movement, 
but rather, a political organization. It argued that the government should immediately begin a 
process of dialogue which would also include the PKK as one of the sides, and HEP as the 
mediator. They demanded cultural rights and political freedoms for the Kurdish minority. HEP was 
closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1993. Party members reorganized under the roof of 
DEP (Democracy Party) whose life span turned out to be even shorter than its predecessor. The 
Constitutional Court closed the party down in 1994. Expecting this closure, party members were 
already organized under the banner of HADEP (People’s Democracy  Party) which then lived long 
enough to compete in the 1995 and 1999 general elections19.
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3. ETHNIC CONFLICT AND VOTE CHOICE
 The theoretical insights for the association between ethnic conflict and vote choice stems 
from several literatures20. At the very basic level we expect political behavior to be a product of 
personal characteristics and environmental factors including socioeconomic conditions and social 
networks21.  A large literature of empirical works which have started to accumulate as early as the 
1950s supports this argument and demonstrates the impact of environmantal factors on turnout, vote 
choice, partisanship and political preferences22. 
 Civil conflicts create profound social changes. They reverse socioeconomic development; 
trigger emigration; redistribute wealth and power in the society and consequently, change the 
relative status of groups; and create and intensify  hatreds23. Wood categorizes these changes under 
six social processes: political mobilization, military socialization, the polarization of social 
identities, the militarization of local authority, the transformation of gender roles, and the 
fragmentation of the local political economy24. And she specifically argues that wartime 
polarization may lead to electoral polarization, segregation, and a distrustful political culture. 
 The theory of issue voting labels social factors as issues and presents them as important 
determinants of vote choice. According to this theory people vote for those candidates whose 
positions on and salience attribution to issues they find similar to their own. Accordingly, parties 
benefit from the salience of issues to which they are generally viewed as attaching highest 
priority25. The salience of an issue varies over time and over individuals. The more salient the issue, 
the greater the expected effect of issue ownership and issue proximity on an individual’s voting 
decision26. 
 Civil conflicts raise the political salience of security issues, and also the salience of those 
issues surrounding the conflict27. Violence creates security threats. A large body of literature in 
political psychology shows that threat perception increases prejudice, aggression towards others, 
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and voting tendencies towards extreme right-wing parties who support aggressive policies to deal 
with these threats28. In the Israeli case empirical findings show that feelings of insecurity increase 
with every terrorist attack mounted against civilians29, and that security threats are important 
predictors of  the vote for radical right-wing parties30. 
 We can also gather theoretical insights from the constructivist arguments and the related 
literature about how identity varies as a function of environmental incentives and strategic 
manipulation31. Chandra and Wilkinson differentiate between nominal identities which are “those 
identity  categories in which an individual is eligible for membership based on the attributes that she 
or he possesses”; and activated identities which are those that the individual choses among her 
nominal identities to guide her behavior32.  An important point here is that identity activation is 
endogenous: It very  much depends on the salience of group-specific attributes which in turn are 
determined by the social context33. Ethnic conflicts provide drastic examples of how the social 
context activates certain identities. Wilkinson and Haid argue that instead of being the product of 
already solid ethnic identities, ethnic conflicts are best seen as an exercise in increasing the salience 
of some dimensions and agendas over others34. Wilkinson even argues that ethnic conflicts are 
provoked by political entrepreneurs to mobilize constituents around one ethnic identity rather than 
another35. Indeed, Appadurai analyzes the genocide in Rwanda as a form of community-building, a 
strategy designed to strengthen the identity of the perpetrators36. Manning and Roy argue that 
national identification is sensitive to patterns of conflict by  providing empirical evidence that 
Catholics from Northern Ireland rarely think of themselves as British while a majority of 
Protestants do37. Shayo and Zussman show how the Palestinian conflict affects judges in Israel and 
demonstrate that attacks lead Arab judges to favor Arab plaintiffs and Jewish judges to favor Jewish 
plaintiffs38. Shayo and Sambanis argue that ethnic conflicts not only make ethnic attributes more 
salient to individuals but they also tend to make ethnic differences more prominent, and thereby 
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reduce perceived similarity to the nation as a whole39. These conflicts also destroy and reallocate 
resources between groups, which can directly affect both national and group  status. In the Turkish 
case, for example, Saatci discusses how the conflict impoverished thousands of Kurds by 
dislocating them from their villages40. Finally, Byman points to the role of state repression in ethnic 
conflicts in terms of identity  creation, and argues how the Sri Lankan government’s violent 
response to Tamil Tigers has created the perception that the Sri Lankan state and army act only in 
the interest of the Sinhalese41. Similarly, Saatci depicts the Turkish-Kurdish conflict as a “double-
edged sword” which has contributed to the growth of ethnic  consciuosness and nationalism on both 
the Turkish and the Kurdish side42. 
 To summarize, theory offers us three main arguments based on which we can expect to see 
an association between ethnic conflicts and vote choice: civil conflicts have profound effects on the 
socioeconomic and political environment which in turn impacts upon vote choice; people tend to 
vote for those candidates whose position on and salience attribution to issues are similar to their 
own, and civil conflicts affect the relative salience of security issues and the issues surrounding the 
conflict; ethnic conflicts activate ethnic identities and activated identities are those that  shape our 
political behavior. 
4. THE MODEL
The data set comprises two observations for each county43, one for the 1995 general election 
and one for the 1999 general election. Note that the data exhibit  a multilevel character: the 
observations are chronologically nested within counties, which in turn are geographically nested 
within provinces. The presence of layers may violate the standard OLS assumption of independent 
error terms if unobserved factors at the county  and province levels lead the error terms to be 
correlated. Ignoring the multilevel character of data risks erroneously  low coefficient standard 
errors, and consequently, increases the risk of declaring significant effects for predictors which in 
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fact have none44. To account for that risk we use the following multilevel linear model in which 
unobserved county and province level factors are incorporated as random effects:
V{t,i,j}= α+ βC{t,i,j}+ θN{t,i,j}+φK{t,i,j} + γX{t,i,j} +ωE{t}+ΩM{t,i,j}+ρ{j}+u{i,j} +ε{t,i,j}
where ρ{j} is the province level error component, u{i,j} is the county level error component, and ε
{t,i,j} is the individual observation level error component, with E(ε{t,i,j})=0, Var (ε{t,i,j}) =σ2; E(u{i,j})=0 
Var(u{i,j})=τ2; E(ρ{j})=0, Var(ρ{j})=ς2; and Cov [ε{t,i,j},u{i,j}]=0, Cov [ε{t,i,j}, ρ{j}]=0, and Cov [u{i,j}, ρ
{j}]=0. 
 V{t,i,j} is the vote share of the party on whose votes we explore the effects of the ethnic 
conflict.  We first explore the effects of the conflict on the vote share of the Kurdish-nationalist 
party  HADEP, and then we explore the effects on the vote share of the Turkish-nationalist  MHP. t 
denotes the time of election, i denotes the county  and j denotes the province. C{t,i,j} is the number of 
SFCs who died in the fight against  the PKK since the previous election; N{t,i,j} is the turnout rate; K
{t,i,j} is the percentage of ethnically  Kurdish population; X{t,i,j} is a vector of socioeconomic, and 
demographic control variables; E{t} is an election dummy that takes on the value 1 for the 1995 
general election and zero for the 1999 general election; and M{t,i,j} is a dummy variable that  takes on 
the value 1 if county i of province j was under state of emergency at the time of election t45. 
 We employ the number of SFCs who died in the fight against the PKK in each county since 
the previous general election as a measure of conflict intensity 46. Admittedly, our measure falls 
short of the total number of casualties which is the most commonly used measure of conflict 
intensity in the literature. But, as we mentioned above, there is no detailed, complete and credible 
panel data available on civilian and insurgent casualties. Hence our data on the SFCs constitute the 
only available measure that can be used to assess the variation in the intensity  of the conflict over 
time and space. Moreover, we argue that it is a good measure first because we expect  it to be highly 
correlated with the total number of casualties and the total number of attacks, and second because it 
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is a good measure of PKK presence in an area.  While lack of data on civilian and insurgent 
casualties, and PKK attacks prevents us from studying how correlated our measure would be with 
such series across counties or provinces over time, the yearly aggregate numbers reported by  the 
Turkish General Staff 47  and the Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org) enable us to 
present some evidence of the correlation at the country level. The yearly country-wide aggregates 
we have for the number of SFCs is 84% correlated with the yearly total casualty, and 98% 
correlated with the yearly total PKK attack numbers that the Turkish General Staff reported. The 
correlation between the yearly  total casualty  numbers reported by the Federation of American 
Scientists is even higher at 97.4%. These high correlations are not surprising considering the fact 
that attacks by  the PKK, and offensive military  operations by the Turkish security  forces claim lives 
from both sides. Unfortunately  they  also claim the lives of civilians. Also, village guards make up a 
significant portion of total casualties, and in many  cases village guards get killed alongside security 
forces in PKK attacks on their villages, or during search or pursuit missions in the area. Another 
major cause of civilian casualties is landmines laid down by both sides.  Needless to say, landmine 
casualties among security forces and civilians are expected to be highly correlated. 
 Moreover, we expect SFCs to be a strong predictor of PKK casualties as offensive military 
operations by Turkish security forces usually  follows PKK attacks, especially  so when those attacks 
result in heavy  casualties on the security forces’ side. Once again, lack of data prevents us from 
supporting our claim by empirical evidence from the Turkish case. Nevertheless, Jaeger and 
Paserman’s48 study  reveals a similar dynamic in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They find that the 
incidence and levels of Palestinian fatalities can be predicted by the incidence and levels of Israeli 
fatalities in the past two months. 
 Most importanly, as the correlation between the number of SFCs and PKK attacks clearly 
demonstrate, SCFs is a good measure of the PKK presence in the area. The presence of PKK 
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insurgents and activity  in an area causes a great deal of inconvenience for the civilian residents. 
Not only  it  means that they can get caught in crossfire, or become a landmine victim, it also means 
that their daily  lives are disturbed by  the heightened security  measures like the increased number of 
security personnel in the area, and the frequent security checks and controls that are imposed on the 
civilians, and also by the frequent interruption of economic activity as a result of attacks and armed 
skirmishes between security forces and the PKK. In many  cases it also means that they will be 
pressured, threatened or even killed by  combatants who may accuse them of collaborating with the 
enemy.  Thus, we argue that, SFCs provide a good measure of the intensity  of the conflict and the 
level of political violence civilians are exposed to. 
 The vector of socioeconomic and demographic variables X{t,i,j} includes population size, 
population growth rate, level of urbanization, unemployment rate, average household size and 
literacy rate. 
 Population measures are frequently used variables in modeling electoral behavior49. 
Population size measures the total population of the county in thousands; population growth rate is 
the average yearly growth rate of the county  population since the last census; and level of 
urbanization is the percentage of county  population living in the county center. Population size and 
the level of urbanization in a locality  may influence vote choice through their effects on the 
availability of and level of exposure to alternative sources of information. Population growth rate 
reflects the migration patterns in a locality which may have an influence on the vote choice of 
inhabitants. 
 One of the stylized facts of the economic voting literature is that voting reacts to a few 
macroeconomic variables, mainly  unemployment and inflation50. Unfortunately, there are no county 
(nor province) level inflation data available for Turkey. Accordingly, the rate of unemployment, 
which is the number of unemployed per hundred persons in labor force serves as our 
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macroeconomic control variable.  
 The average household size is a proxy to capture the center-periphery distinction in the 
Turkish society. In his seminal work, which has heavily influenced the literature on electoral 
behavior in Turkey, Mardin argues that the center-periphery relations provide a good explanatory 
scheme to understand Turkish politics51. According to this scheme, the Turkish political system is 
composed of a coherent  body of nationalist, laicist, etatist, educated, urban, "elite" which 
constitutes the "center; and a "periphery" constituted by the more traditional, more conservative, 
more religious, more rural, "antietatist" populations. The center-periphery divide in the Turkish 
politics nicely coincides with the left-right divide. Recent survey studies confirm that the center-
periphery framework still retains its validity for Turkish politics52. Çarkoğlu and Hinich based on 
the results of a 2001 survey, conclude that two dimensions dominate the ideological competition in 
the Turkish party system: the secularist  vs. pro-Islamist cleavage which again largely  overlaps with 
the center versus periphery  formations in Turkish politics; and the ethnic based nationalist cleavage 
contrasting the Turkish and Kurdish identities53. 
 Household size is a good measure of conservatism as it is positively  correlated with the level 
of religious conservatism, and agricultural employment, and negatively  correlated with the 
education level of women. Thus, we argue that it can be used to capture the center-periphery 
dichotomy. 
 Finally, literacy rate is included as a measure of political awareness, and social development 
in a county. 
5. DATA
5.1. Data on Security Force Casualties
 The casualty  data set includes the date, and place of death at the county level for a total of 
6802 SFCs who died in the fight against  the PKK between August 1984 and January 2012. The 
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period in between the 1991 and 1999 general elections, which is the period we will be focusing on 
in our analyses, harbors 4794 of them. This is a unique data set that we constructed by  bringing 
together the information we obtained from numerous sources including the Turkish General Staff, 
Ministry of Defense, Administration of Police Forces, local administrations, civil society 
organizations, and newspaper archieves. We explain the data collection process and the sources we 
referred to in detail in the Appendix. 
 Our data set  constitutes the only  available detailed information on the casualties of the 
conflict in Turkey. Nevertheless, it has its limitations. First of all, we only have information on the 
security force casualties. Admittely, a better measure would include civilian and insurgent casualties 
as well, but unfortunately  there is no credible and publicly available information on them. On the 
other hand, we are confident in the reliability of our data on SFCs. As we explain in more detail in 
the Appendix, the information for the casualties of the 1984-September 1998 period comes directly 
from the Turkish Ministry of Defense personnel archieves. This is actualy the most  reliable source 
for this type of information, and consequently we do not expect to have any unaccounted or 
misreported casualties for this period.  Furthermore, to guarantee the reliability  of our information 
on the SFCs of the October 1998 - April 1999 period we referred to several sources simultaneously, 
in many cases including the families of the deceased, and cross checked the information on each 
casualty.  
 The second limitation of our data set is that we only have information on place of death at 
the county level. While some of these casualties took place in or close to villages, towns or cities, 
some of the soldiers were killed in clashes in remote mountaneous areas quite far from populated 
centers. Because we do not have the exact location of death, we are not able to control for the 
distance of the violent act to the nearest settlement, and consequently, we treat all casualties the 
same in terms of their impact on voters. 
14
 Chart 2(a) and Chart 2(b) below provide visual representations of the distribution of SFCs at 
the county level in the 1991-1995, and the 1995-1999 period respectively. They reveal the 
concentration of PKK attacks in southeastern Turkey54.
Chart 2(a): The Distribution of SFCs, 1991-1995
Chart 2(b) :The Distribution of SCFs, 1995-1999
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5.2. Data on Elections 
 We employ the county  level results of the December 24th, 1995, and April 18th, 1999 
parliamentary  elections. The data are obtained from the Turkish Institute of Statistics. The usage of 
county  level data on actual vote choice is an important aspect of this study. Note that most studies in 
the literature employ  individual level survey data to analyze the association between conflict and 
political attitudes and behavior. Individual level survey data allows researchers to more effectively 
control for exposure to violence, and personal characteristics of voters including psychological and 
perceptional factors, level of awareness, ideological preferences, and party identification which are 
important determinants of vote choice. Nevertheless, it also raises significant concerns in terms of 
representativeness of the sample, and in terms of non-response and response biases. In many  cases 
the intensity  of the conlict, security  concerns, or limitations imposed by the authorities may render 
it impossible to reach certain locations and their residents. Moreover, declarations may always 
differ from actual behavior, especially when respondents try  to give the “appropriate” answers, or 
refrain from answering certain questions. Usage of county-level actual votes eliminates such 
concerns. We should also emphasize the importance of studying the actual political reaction of 
people to conflict because, in nonauthoritarian societies, this reaction greatly influences government 
policies. 
 Turkey had 7 general elections since the start of armed attacks by the PKK in 1984. We 
focus on the 1995 and 1999 general elections for several reasons.  First of all, a Kurdish-nationalist 
party competed only in the 1995, 1999, and 2002 general elections55. 
 Our second reason for focusing on the 1995 and 1999 general elections is the limited 
availability of county level socieconomic indicators. The only source of country-wide socieconomic 
data at the county level in Turkey is the population censuses which were held every  five years 
between 1965 and 2000, with the unfortunate exception of 1995. After 2000, the five-yearly 
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censuses were completely  abandoned to be replaced by a new computerized system of population 
registration. Unfortunately, during the transition period which lasted until 2007, no county level 
data were released. In short, we only  have 1990 and 2000 values for our county level 
socioeconomic controls, and this obliges us to choose two elections among the feasible three. The 
choice about which elections to study is actually dictated by the cease-fire that lasted from the 
second half of 1999 until 2004. The fact that the PKK ceased its attacks between the 1999 and 2002 
elections renders our measure of ethnic conflict inappropriate for the period. Consequently, we use 
the indicators derived from the 1990 census results as our socioeconomic controls for the 1995 
general election, and the ones derived from the 2000 census results as our controls for the 1999 
general elections56. 
 Table 1 displays the major political parties that entered the 1995 and 1999 elections, the 
percentage of votes they received, and their general ideological  placement57. 
Table 1: Political parties that entered the 1995 and 1999 
general elections, and the percentage votes they received
1995 1999
ANAP (center-right) 19.6 13.22
DSP (center-left) 14.6 22.19
DYP (center-right) 19.2 12.01
HADEP (Kurdish-nationalist) 4.2 4.75
MHP (Turkish-nationalist) 8.2 17.98
RP/FP (pro-Islamist) 21.4 15.41
CHP (center-left) 10.7 8.7
5.3. Data on Socioeconomic and Demographic Indicators 
We derive our socioeconomic variables from two county-level development studies 
conducted by the State Planning Agency based on the 1990 and 2000 censuses58.
 The data set also contains an estimate of the ethnically Kurdish population percentage in 
each county.  The derivation and inclusion of a control for the ethnic distribution of population 
across counties is a rather important aspect of this study. Although it  is quite obvious that a model 
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trying to capture the electoral response to ethnic political violence should control for the ethnic 
make up of the society, the lack of data dictates their omission in many cases leading to 
spuriousness concerns. The inclusion of this control eases such concerns for our analyses.
 We derive our Kurdish population estimates by combining the results of the 1965 census 
with those of the 1990 and 2000 censuses. The 1965 population census is the last census in Turkey 
to include questions about mother tongue. Considering those who reported Kurdish as their mother 
tongue in 1965 as ethnically Kurdish, and aggregating the results at the province level, Mutlu 
(1993) reports the 1965 Kurdish population percentages of provinces in Turkey59. Combining these 
1965 provincial percentages, and the 1990 and 2000 census results which provide information on 
birthplace distribution of county residents, we derived average expected Kurdish population 
percentages for counties for 1990 and 2000. To do this, we used the 1965 provincial Kurdish 
population percentages as probabilities of being Kurdish for people who were born in those 
provinces60. These estimates put the total of ethnic Kurds in Turkey to 14% of the population in 
1990, and to little more than 15% in 2000. Note that the estimate for 2000 is very  close to the result 
of the 2006 survey study we have mentioned before which puts the total to 15.6%61. 
 Table 2 displays the mean values and standard deviations for the control variables included 
in the analyses. The table distinguishes between counties that suffered at least one SFC in the 
periods we are interested in and those with no casualties.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
(C) gives the mean value for counties with at least one SFC in between the general elections.
(NC) gives the mean value for counties with no casualty in the same period.
Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
1995 1999
Number of counties C:
NC:
179
678
133
737
SFCs since the previous election C:
NC:
16.99 (32.15)
0 (0)
9.86 (16.63)
0 (0)
Percentage of Kurdish population C:
NC:
43.78 (27.49)
5.03 (10.34)
46.45 (27.00)
7.10 (13.09)
Turnout rate C:
NC:
80.04 (7.12)
86.13 (6.18)
84.04 (4.58)
90.03 (3.98)
Population size C:
NC:
78.80 (12.11)
45.92 (63.56)
86.42 (14.48)
56.06 (98.56)
Population growth rate (%) C:
NC:
1.16 (3.26)
0.94 (2.58)
0.28 (2.83)
0.49 (1.99)
Level of Urbanization (%) C:
NC:
37.14 (20.07)
37.21 (17.60)
46.01 (20.67)
43.59 (18.26)
Household size C:
NC:
6.41 (0.93)
5.16 (0.92)
6.68 (1.49)
4.95 (1.21)
Unemployment rate (%) C:
NC:
5.25 (3.75)
3.78 (2.52)
5.32 (5.48)
5.97 (3.81)
Literacy rate C:
NC:
63.37 (14.47)
78.63 (7.56)
74. 11 (10.81)
85.13 (6.36)
6. RESULTS
6.1. The Vote Share of Kurdish-Nationalists
 We estimate our model using the restricted maximum likelihood (REML)62  estimation 
technique. 
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 The column on the left in Table 3 below presents the results of the regression analyses 
testing the effects of the conflict on the vote share of the Kurdish-nationalist HADEP.  The 
estimated coefficient of SFCs is positive and highly significant. Each additional SFC, on the 
average is associated with a 0.09 percentage point increase in the vote share of HADEP.  The 
magnitude of this result is better understood by considering that the average number of SFCs in the 
109 counties which were under the state of emergency in the 1991-1995 period was 24, and that 
there were 23 counties with more than 50 casualties, and 6 with more than 100. In other words, the 
ethnic conflict was, on the average, associated with a 2 percentage point increase in the vote share 
of HADEP in the 1995 election in counties under the state of emergency, and with more than 5 
percentage point increase in counties with casualties over 50. Chart 3 below visualizes the results. 
It depicts what happens to HADEP votes when you move from a county  with no SFCs to a county 
with average number of SFCs, holding everything else constant63. The curve on the left plots the 
density  of expected HADEP vote share in a county  with no SFCs. The curve to the right plots the 
density  in a county with 17 SCFs, which is the average number of SFCs in counties with positive 
casualties.  As the chart demonstrates, HADEP votes go up  by about 2 percentage points on the 
average as the number of SFCs increase from zero to 17. The simulation exercise when controls 
are set at their mean values for 1999 yields a very similar picture.
 Note that some of the socioeconomic controls like household size, literacy rate and 
unemployment rate turn out to be highly significantly and substantially  associated with HADEP 
votes.  One explanation for these results might the cultural differences between ethnic Kurds and 
Turks, and the religious conservatism of ethnically Kurdish populations in Turkey. Consequently, 
ethnic Kurds tend to have higher birth rates, live in bigger households, and have lower literacy 
rates, especially among women. In fact, as can be seen in Table.A6 in the Appendix, our estimates 
for the ethnically Kurdish population are 65% correlated with household size, and 69% correlated 
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with literacy  rate across counties for the period we are analyzing64. In other words, along with our 
ethnic population estimates, these controls might be picking up the ethnic dimension of the votes 
for HADEP. The significant, highly  substantial and negative association between houshold size 
and MHP vote share supports this argument as well. The significant association between 
unemployment rate and HADEP votes might be due to the fact that HADEP, in terms of economic 
policy, was a leftist  party which supported socialist ideals and a welfare state. The low correlation 
between unemployment rate and ethnic Kurdish population estimates across counties does not 
support arguments based on ethnic discrimination in employment. Finally, one can argue that the 
detrimental impacts of the conflict on economic activity  might lead to higher unemployment rates 
in the conflict zone, which might then impact upon vote choices. While this is a valid argument, 
the near zero correlation between unemployment rate and SFCs across counties, and the fact that 
we fail to see any significant impact on the vote share of Turkish nationalists lead us to think that it 
can only be a partial one.   
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Chart 3:Simulated HADEP Vote Shares
Expected HADEP Votes
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TABLE 3: Effect on the Vote Share of Ethnic-Nationalist Parties
Estimates from the mixed effects REML regressions
Number of obs.: 1727 Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
Number of groups                                            
Province:80                                                      
County:870
 Vote share of HADEP    Vote share of MHP         
Constant 
7.688
(3.456)
24.39***
(4.92)
SFCs since the previous election 0.09***
(0.012)
0.08***
(0.017)
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population 0.205***
(0.024)
-0.137**
(0.037)
Turnout -0.057**
(0.026)
0.058
(0.036)
Population size 0.006***
(0.002)
-0.005**
(0.002)
Population growth rate 0.188***
(0.053)
0.147*
(0.078)
Urbanization level -0.011
(0.013)
-0.013
(0.016)
Household size 0.915***
(0.194)
-1.444***
(0.262)
Unemployment rate 0.243***
(0.053)
0.111
(0.075)
Literacy rate -0.084***
(0.028)
-0.013
(0.034)
Election dummy -1.214***
(0.284)
-10.24***
(0.401)
State of emergency dummy -0.357
(0.840)
3.325**
(1.482)
Variance Components
Province level (ς2)
County level (τ2)
 
Observation level (σ2)
3.26***                  
(0.363)
4.99***
(0.148)
2.77***
(0.067)
6.21***                    
(0.569)
                             
3.30***
(0.211)
4.97***
(0.124)
-2 Log Likelihood: 10327 11242
***:significant at 1% level; **:significant at 5% level; *:significant at 10% level.
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6.2. The Vote Share of Turkish-Nationalists
 The column on the right in Table 3 above displays the results for the second set of 
regressions investigating the effects of  the conflict on the vote share of Turkish-nationalists. Each 
additional SFC is, on the average, associated with a 0.08 percentage point increase MHP’s vote 
share. In other words, the ethnic conflict  is, on the average, associated with a 2 percentage point 
increase in the vote share of MHP in the 1995 election in counties under the state of emergency, and 
with more than 4 percentage point increase in counties with casualties over 50. Chart 4 below 
visualizes the results. It depicts what happens to MHP votes when you move from a county  with no 
SFCs to a county with average number of SFCs, holding everything else constant. The bell shaped 
curve on the left plots the density of expected MHP vote share in a county with no SFCs, while the 
curve to the  right plots the density  of expected MHP vote share in a county with 17 SCFs. As can 
be seen, MHP votes are on the average 2 percentage points higher in counties with average number 
of SFCs. The simulation exercise when controls are set at their mean values for 1999 yields a very 
similar picture.
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 The results on the vote shares of the ethnic nationalist parties reveal that the ongoing ethnic 
conflict in Turkey is associated with a rise in both Kurdish and Turkish nationalism in the country65.
 To provide a more complete picture of the effects of the conflict  on the electoral landscape 
we also examine the individual vote shares of the other parties that competed in the 1995 and 1999 
elections. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the results of the regressions when the dependent 
variable is the individual vote share of ANAP, RP, CHP, DYP, and DSP respectively. The first three 
of these parties had a relatively  moderate stance on the Kurdish question during the time period we 
are analyzing66. The results clearly  demonstrate the negative association between the ethnic conflict 
and the vote shares of these moderate parties. The remaining two, DYP and DSP, ideologically 
stood somewhere in between the moderates and the extreme MHP on the Kurdish-Turkish 
nationalist cleavage67. Note that we fail to find any significant association between the vote shares 
of these two parties and the ethnic conflict in the period under study. 
 The results clearly demonstrate how the ethnic conflict in Turkey increases the political 
salience of ethnic nationalism, and polarizes the electorate along an ethnic nationalist  cleavage. In 
that sense they support the theoretical insights about the positive association between ethnic 
conflicts and the salience of ethnic issues. They are also in line with the issue voting and issue 
ownership arguments. The conflict is pushing the electorate towards extreme ethnic nationalists 
who are perceived to be the champions of ethnic issues while hurting the political success of those 
with relatively moderate stances. Moreover, they support Wood’s (2008) argument about the 
electorally  polarizing effects of civil conflicts68. Polarization has vast  ramifications for a country’s 
political system.  As argued in Sartori’s seminal work, polarization causes centrifugal pressures that 
shift away the support for centrist parties and inhibit the formation of stable parliamentary 
majorities69. This directly  leads to the fragmentation and destabilization of democratic regimes. In 
addition, polarization is likely to cause both social conflict  and marked fluctuations of public 
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policies, thus undermining the country’s political and economic performance. In the case of ethnic 
conflicts, polarization along an ethnic nationalist cleavage does not really bode well for a peaceful 
and timely resolution as the poles tend to have irreconcilable views on the issues surronding the 
conflict and the ways to deal with them. Polarization then implies that these irreconcilable views are 
taking hold in the society more and more as a result  of the conflict itself. Collier et al. discuss how 
civil conflicts through their adverse effects on the economy create a trap that makes peaceful 
resolution even more difficult70. The results we have here point  to another trap ethnic conflicts 
create, namely, the polarization trap. Given the adverse effects of polarization, these results can 
help  us understand why civil conflicts last long; why they do not end in peaceful, negotiated 
settlements more often; and why they leave societies marked for future conflict. 
6.3 Ethnic Conflicts and Ethnic Identity
 The task that remains now is to understand the characteristics of the observed electoral 
polarization. If the constructivist insight about the endogeneity of  ethnic identity to ethnic conflicts 
is valid then we can expect this polarization to actually be a reflection of an ethnic polarization that 
is associated with the conflict. Unfortunately, because we do not have individual level data we can 
not say anything about the ethnic make up of votes. Nevertheless, the ethnic nationalist appeal of 
the political parties under investigation here, the ethnic nature of the conflict, and the significant 
positive (negative) association between the Kurdish population percentages and the vote share of 
Kurdish nationalists (Turkish-nationalists) lead us to hypothesize that what we are seeing is in fact a 
positive association between the conflict and ethnic Kurdish votes for the Kurdish-nationalists, and 
similarly  a positive association between the conflict and ethnic Turkish votes for the Turkish-
nationalists. And if that is the case then it means that ethnic conflicts not only  raise the political 
salience of ethnic issues in a society in general, but also raise the political salience of ethnic identity 
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itself among ethnic groups in the society, and that the constructivists are making a valid argument. 
So far, due to lack of individual level data, and the difficulty  of measuring concepts like identity and 
salience of identity, literature offers limited empirical evidence to support this argument. And in 
many cases, the evidence does not go beyond anectodal references to the “legacy of hatred”71.
 Unfortunately, the Turkish case also suffers from the lack of individual level data on ethnic 
identity  and vote choice. Nevertheless, King offers us a method of “reconstructing individual 
behavior from aggregate data”72. King’s ecological inference (ei) methodology allows us to use the 
ethnic population percentages we derived to estimate the ethnic Kurdish and Turkish73  votes for 
HADEP and MHP in the 1995 and 1999 general elections74. We then use these estimates to test 
whether the conflict increases the political salience of ethnic identities. 
 The results of this exercise are presented in Table 4 below. We reestimate our base model 
using the estimated ethnic Kurdish and Turkish votes for HADEP and MHP respectively as our 
dependent variable.  The estimated parameters reveal the significant positive association between 
the conflict and the votes the two ethnic nationalist  parties receive from their coethnics. In other 
words, they  give support to the conjecture that the conflict increases the political salience of ethnic 
identity  leading ethnic Kurds to vote for Kurdish-nationalists, and ethnic Turks to vote for Turkish-
nationalists75. 
 Note that these results should be viewed as substantially more speculative than the main 
results presented in Table 3, and should not be taken as conclusive evidence since they are not based 
on a very  rich set of information to begin with. Given the fact that actual ethnic votes are not 
observable, and that ecological inferences expose one to the risk of ecological fallacies, we present 
these results cognizant of their limitations. We argue that the results, should be read as preliminary 
evidence and as a suggestion that future research should take into account the constructivist 
arguments about the endogeneity of ethnic identity to ethnic conflicts.
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TABLE 4: Effects of the Ethnic Conflict on Ethnic Votes for Ethnic-Nationalists
Estimates from the mixed effects REML regressions
Dependent Variable
# of observations:1727
# of groups:870
Turkish votes for 
HADEP
Kurdish votes for 
HADEP
Turkish votes for 
MHP
Kurdish votes for 
MHP
Constant      5.366***
(1.46)
     48.32***
(7.37)
     24.25***
(5.99)
     2.428***
(0.680)
SFCs since the 
previous election
-0.008 
(0.005)
    0.080***
(0.026)
     0.103***
(0.021)
    0.011***
(0.002)
Percentage of ethnically 
Kurdish population
    -0.022***
(0.008)
-0.035
(0.057)
0.025
(0.042)
0.003
(0.005)
Turnout -0.001
(0.011)
    -0.167***
(0.055)
0.066
(0.045)
0.008
(0.005)
Population size -0.001
(0.001)
     0.018***
(0.004)
-0.005*
(0.003)
-0.0004
(0.0003)
Population growth rate 0.143
(0.095)
    0.356***
(0.111)
0.143
(0.095)
0.015
(0.011)
Urbanization level 0.022
 (0.023)
-0.014            
 (0.027)
-0.028
 (0.019)
-0.003
 (0.002)
Household size    0.318***
(0.079)
     1.599***
(0.414)
   -1.737***
(0.321)
   -0.189***
(0.036)
Unemployment rate -0.009
(0.023)
    0.482***
(0.112)
0.146
(0.093)
0.016
(0.011)
Literacy rate    -0.066***
(0.011)
    -0.274***
(0.060)
 0.006
(0.04)
0.0002
(0.004)
Election dummy     -0.693***
(0.119)
    -3.207***
(0.603)
    -10.60***
(0.487)
    -1.189***
(0.056)
State of emergency 
dummy
-0.225
(0.353)
-1.013
(1.781)
0.940
(1.725)
0.108
(0.197)
Variance components are not reported.
-2 Log Likelihood 7372 12927 11929 4463
***:significant at 1% level; **  :significant at 5% level; *    :significant at 10% level.
7. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 We have performed several robustness checks on the main results presented in Table 3. 
These tests show that the positive association between the ethnic conflict  and the vote shares of 
ethnic nationalist  parties are robust to alternative specifications of the model, and the conflict 
measure used in the analyses, as well as to excluding outlier observations from the sample. The 
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results of the tests are presented in the Appendix. Table A2 presents the results when the number of 
SFCs include those who died in attacks in neighboring counties as well76. Table A3 presents the 
results when the model is specified with fixed province effects and county level clustered errors. 
Table A4 presents the results when outlier observations are excluded from the data set77. As can be 
seen, the results remain robust.  
7.2 Reverse Causality
One concern in estimating the effects of political violence on vote choice is that there may be a 
dynamic interaction between these two variables. In other words, while violence may influence 
voting behavior, it  may also be staged in response to electoral choices. In such a case, estimates of 
the effects of political violence on vote choice will be biased. Note that the situation in Turkey does 
not warrant such a concern. As we have already mentioned, PKK attacks have been concentrated in 
southeastern Turkey. The area is chosen not because of its residents’ electoral profile but because it 
was claimed as part of the Kurdish homeland by the PKK, and also because the mountainous 
terrain, which borders Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia, helped guerilla warfare and provided the 
insurgents with shelters, and escape routes. Moreover most attacks targeted military  facilities rather 
than civilian targets. Nevertheless, to scientifically assess that reverse causality is not creating any 
specification problems in our analyses, we estimated the coefficients of the following  equation to 
see if the number of SFCs in between two elections is determined by the results of the prior 
election:
C{t,i,j}=α + βC{t-1,i,j}+ηV{t-1,i,j}+θN{t-1,i,j}+φK{t-1,i,j} + γX{t-1,i,j} +ΩM{t-1,i,j}+ ρS{i,j} +ε{t,i}
where t denotes the election year, i denotes the county, and j denotes the province. C{t,i.j} is the 
number of SFCs who died in the fight against the PKK insurgency between the election at (t-1) and 
the election at t in county i of province j; C{t-1,i,j} is then the number of SFCs who died the fight 
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against the PKK insurgency  between the election at (t-2) and the election at (t-1); V{t-1,i,j} is the vote 
share of the party  we are interested in in the (t-1) election; N{t-1,i,j} is the turnout rate; K{t-1,i,j} is the 
percentage of ethnically Kurdish population; X{t-1,i,j} is the vector of socioeconomic variables; M
{t-1,i,j} is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if the county was under state of emergency in (t-1); and 
finally S{i,j} is a dummy variable that  takes on the value 1 if the county has a border with Iraq, Syria, 
Iran, or Armenia.
 We estimate the above equation for the 1995-1999 period (t=1999) using OLS with clustered 
errors at the province level78. Unfortunately  we are not able to conduct a similar analysis for the 
1991-1995 period to see whether the SFCs of the period was determined by the Kurdish and/or 
Turkish-nationalist  votes in the 1991 general election since neither MHP nor HADEP entered the 
1991 general elections. Table A.5 in the Appendix displays the results.  None of the estimated βs are 
significant indicating that the data do not support the reverse causality hypothesis.
9. CONCLUSION
This study analyzes the effects of the Turkish-Kurdish ethnic conflict  on the electoral 
choices of Turkish voters in the 1995 and 1999 general elections.  The results demonstrate a 
significant positive association between the conflict and the vote shares of Kurdish and Turkish-
nationalist parties, and as such, they indicate the polarization of the electorate along an ethnic 
nationalist cleavage. Given the completely opposing views of these parties on how to resolve the 
conflict, such a polarization does not actually bode well for a peaceful and timely  resolution. It 
seems the conflict is leading people to mass behind two opposing groups with irreconcilable claims 
about the reasons of and solutions to the conflict. What the Turkish case is presenting us here is, in a 
sense, a circular structure with ethnic conflict feeding political polarization which then renders a 
peaceful and timely resolution more difficult, in other words, a polarization trap. Horowitz makes a 
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similar argument in his seminal work on ethnic conflicts when he talks about how ethnic parties 
may exacerbate ethnic conflict by coming up  with “mutually  incompatible” claims to power79. We 
argue that, along with the other results in the literature on the detrimental sociopolitical effects of 
civil conflicts, the polarization trap  can shed further light on the self-perpetuating dynamics of these 
conflicts, and can help us better understand the reasons behind their resilience. 
We also present some preliminary evidence that what we are observing is not just  a political 
polarization along an ethnic nationalist dimension, but also a rise in the political salience of ethnic 
identities which then reflects on vote choice. The results of the ecological regressions reveal how 
the conflict  increasingly brings ethnic identities to the forefront in vote choice, and thus, further 
deepens the  ethnic cleavage in the society. 
The observed ethnic nature of most civil conflicts has led scholars to devise and test various 
hypotheses on how conflict and the number of ethnic groups in a society  are related80. Interestingly, 
a good portion of these failed to establish a clear association which then led scholars on a quest for 
better ethnic heterogeneity measures81. Note that while these studies significantly advance our 
understanding of ethnic conflicts, they all, implicitly or explicitly, assume that the salience of ethnic 
identity  for any two co-ethnics will be the same for both and will remain fixed. In other words, they 
ignore the constructivist insight about the endogeneity  of the salience of ethnic identities to ethnic 
conflict itself. The results in this paper support this insight. If it is not  just ethnic identity itself but 
rather the salience of that identity that drives people’s behavior, then this endogeneity  might 
actually explain why scholars have so far not  been able to establish a clear link between ethnicity 
and ethnic conflict even though they strongly  suspect that it exists.  We therefore close by 
emphasizing the need to find new and novel ways to incorporate the dynamic link between ethnic 
identity and ethnic conflict into our studies on such conflicts.
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APPENDIX
Data Sources for Security Force Casualties:
Our main source for military casualties is a publication, named "Our Martyrs (Șehitlerimiz)", 
published by  the Turkish Ministry of Defense in late 1998. The publication lists the names, ranks, 
and place of death of all Turkish soldiers who died in the fight against the PKK insurgency in the 
August 1984-September 1998 period. In total, the list contains information on 5554 soldiers. This 
publication actually provides the most credible, and accurate information on military casualties as 
the information is directly taken from the personnel archives of the Ministry of Defense. 
Unfortunately, the list  covers casualties up to mid 1998, and detailed information on place of death 
is missing for gendermarie casualties. In order to bring the database up to date with detailed 
information on places of death, we referred to various other sources. We contacted the Associations 
of the Families of Martyrs 82  in 28 provinces. These associations are civil society organizations 
founded by families of soldiers and police officers who died in service, to help  each other cope with 
the situation. They helped us greatly in gathering information about the SFCs from their area. We 
have also contacted and obtained information from numerous military bases in different parts of the 
country, and also the Gendarmerie Museum in Ankara which has an extensive database on 
gendarmerie casualties. Another important source has been the archives of daily newspapers. We 
searched through the daily  archives of five major Turkish newspapers (Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, 
Zaman, Sabah, Hurriyet) for news on PKK attacks. Even though the newspapers did not cover all 
the attacks and all the casualties, they  still provided information on a good deal of them.  The 
internet has been another important source of information. We have conducted searches using 
related words like PKK, attack, Kurdish conflict, terror, martyr, etc. and skimmed through 
thousands of websites that came up on these searches. We referred to some 359 of these websites83. 
Most of them are commemorative sites maintained by local administrations including 
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governorships, municipalities, village associations, and civil society organizations. Finally, we 
obtained the information on the casualties of the police forces directly from the public relations 
office of the Administration of Security Forces.
TABLE A1: Effects of the Ethnic Conflict on the Vote Share of the Other Political Parties
Estimates from the mixed effects REML regressions
Number of obs.:1727
Number of groups:870
Dependent 
variable: 
ANAP’s vote 
Dependent 
variable:
RP’s vote 
Dependent 
variable:
CHP’s vote 
Dependent 
variable:
DYP’s vote
Dependent 
variable:
DSP’s vote
Constant    11.80**
(5.10)
    32.82***       
(5.33)
-1.81            
(3.64)
-2.59            
(5.48)
    39.74***       
(4.20)
SFCs in the area since 
the previous election
    -0.056***
(0.018)
   -0.094***
(0.019) 
  -0.024*
(0.013) 
 -0.013
(0.019) 
 0.009
(0.015) 
Percentage of ethnically 
Kurdish population
    -0.067**
(0.034)
-0.064
(0.041) 
0.034
(0.025) 
-0.029
(0.033) 
  -0.074**
(0.036) 
Turnout 0.013
(0.038)
   -0.079**
 (0.039)
   -0.059**
 (0.027)
   0.179***
 (0.041)
   -0.141***
 (0.031)
Population size     -0.006***
(0.002)
  0.005
  (0.003)
  -0.002
  (0.002)
    -0.006***
  (0.002)
     0.008***
  (0.002)
Population growth rate  0.081
(0.081)
   0.101
   (0.082)
      -0.248***
   (0.055)
      -0.184**
   (0.088)
  -0.008
   (0.065)
Urbanization level 0.005
 (0.016)
       0.077***
   (0.019)
   0.001
   (0.013)
   -0.031*
   (0.017)
     -0.032**
   (0.014)
Household size 0.182
(0.271)
      1.110***
   (0.296)
  0.023
   (0.203)
  0.176
   (0.287)
     -2.193***
   (0.224)
Unemployment rate -0.06
(0.079)
     -0.254***
 (0.081)
-0.052
 (0.056)
-0.062
 (0.085)
0.002
 (0.063)
Literacy rate 0.011
(0.035)
    -0.224***
 (0.042)
     0.183***
 (0.029)
0.047
 (0.029)
0.029
 (0.03)
Election dummy     6.155***
(0.422)
     4.883***
 (0.431)
      2.795***
 (0.297)
      6.451***
 (0.468)
      -5.54***
 (0.333)
State of emergency 
dummy
2.647*
(1.534)
      2.528*
    (1.337)
  0.268
    (0.897)
  0.531
    (1.708)
  1.769
    (1.179)
Variance Components
Province level (ς2)
 
County level (τ2)
 
Observation level (σ2)
4.96***          
(0.442)
                
3.27***
(0.221)
5.31***
(0.129)
6.92***          
(0.629)
                
6.67***
(0.210)
4.34***
(0.106)
3.63***          
(0.362)
                
4.92***
(0.149)
2.95***
(0.072)
4.25***          
(0.407)
                
2.30***
(0.359)
6.30***
(0.155)
7.04***          
(0.637)
                
3.53***
(0.152)
3.83***
(0.093)
-2 Log Likelihood 11378 11695 10447 11660 10690
***:significant at 1% level; **  :significant at 5% level; *    :significant at 10% level.
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Robustness Checks:
Table A2: Effects of the Ethnic Conflict on Electoral Behavior Using an Alternative Conflict Measure
Estimates from the mixed effects REML regressions
# of observations:1727
# of groups:870
Dependent variable: 
HADEP’s vote share
Dependent variable:
MHP’s vote share
Constant    5.875**
(3.63)
    17.77***            
(5.02)
SFCs in the area since the previous election     0.019***
(0.003)
   0.034***
(0.005) 
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population     0.204***
(0.024)
   -0.166***
(0.037) 
Turnout    -0.056**
(0.026)
   0.071**
 (0.036)
Population size     0.006***
(0.002)
     -0.004**
  (0.002)
Population growth rate     0.180***
(0.053)
   0.116
   (0.077)
Urbanization level -0.012
 (0.013)
   -0.016
   (0.015)
Household size     0.971***
(0.197)
      -1.213***
   (0.263)
Unemployment rate     0.246***
(0.053)
 0.122
 (0.075)
Literacy rate    -0.067**
(0.030)
 0.040
 (0.035)
Election dummy     -1.141***
(0.288)
    -10.06***
 (0.398)
State of emergency dummy -0.478
(0.842)
       3.260**
    (1.460)
Variance Components
Province level (ς2)
 
County level (τ2)
 
Observation level (σ2)
3.40***              
(0.373)
                     
5.02***
(0.148)
2.77***
(0.067)
6.31***             
(0.577)
                    
3.35***
(0.203)
4.87***
(0.121)
-2 Log Likelihood 10347 11211
***:significant at 1% level; **  :significant at 5% level; *    :significant at 10% level.
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TABLE A3: Effects  of the Ethnic Conflict on Electoral Behavior Under Province  Level  Fixed Effects 
and County Level Clustered Errors Specification
Estimates from linear regressions, standard error adjusted for 870 clusters in county
Number of observations:1727 Dependent variable: 
HADEP’s vote share
Dependent variable:
MHP’s vote share
Constant 8,651
(7.750)
    21.809***        
(5.827)
SFCs since the previous election     0.097***
(0.039)
   0.072***
(0.017) 
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population     0.134***
(0.118)
   0.156***
(0.090) 
Turnout  -0.116**
(0.046)
    0.095**
 (0.039)
Population size     0.006**
(0.003)
    -0.005**
  (0.002)
Population growth rate 0.116
(0.090)
   0.080
   (0.086)
Urbanization level -0.033*
 (0.016)
   -0.013
   (0.016)
Household size     1.024**
(0.403)
     -1.256***
   (0.317)
Unemployment rate     0.452***
(0.122)
 0.059
 (0.079)
Literacy rate     -0.068***
(0.076)
 0.079*
 (0.040)
Election dummy -1.037
(0.643)
     -9.500***
 (0.439)
State of emergency dummy -0.79
(0.665)
   6.092**
  (0.849)
Parameter estimates for province dummies are not reported.
R-Squared 0.6657 0.6757
***:significant at 1% level; **  :significant at 5% level; *    :significant at 10% level.
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TABLE A4: Effects  of the Ethnic Conflict on HADEP’s  Vote Share When Outlier Observations  are 
Excluded
Dependent Variable:      
HADEP’s Vote Share
Dependent Variable:      
MHP’s Vote Share
Estimates from the mixed effects REML regressions # of observations:1719
# of Provinces:80 
# of counties: 868
# of observations:1714
# of Provinces:80 
# of counties: 870
Constant   6.870**
(2.983)
      24.48***
(4.682)
SFCs since the previous election     0.088***
(0.011)
    0.079***
(0.016)
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population     0.207***
(0.022)
    -0.142***
(0.036)
Turnout  -0.037*
(0.022)
  0.057*
(0.035)
Population size     0.006***
(0.002)
    -0.004**
(0.002)
Population growth rate    0.137***
(0.045)
  0.145**
(0.075)
Urbanization level -0.001
 (0.011)
-0.013
 (0.015)
Household size     0.834***
(0.170)
    -1.313***
(0.251)
Unemployment rate     0.213***
(0.045)
0.091
(0.071)
Literacy rate     -0.094***
(0.025)
-0.021
(0.033)
Election dummy    -1.05***
(0.249)
   -10.31***
(0.383)
State of emergency dummy -0.35
(0.696)
    3.477**
(1.401)
Variance Components
Province level (ς2)   
 
County level (τ2)
 
Observation level (σ2)
3.22***              
(0.360)
                    
5.01***
(0.141)
2.25***
(0.055)
6.23***              
(0.566)
                    
3.22***
(0.198)
4.66***
(0.118)
-2 Log Likelihood: 9903 10983
***:significant at 1% level; **  :significant at 5% level; *    :significant at 10% level.
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Reverse Causality Analyses:
TABLE A.5: Effects of Nationalist Votes on SFCs
Linear Regressions with Robust, Clustered Errors at the Province Level
Dependent Variable: Security force casualties in the 1995-1999 period Number of Observations: 857
Constant 2.487
(4.215)
2.507                    
(4.536)
Vote share of HADEP in 1995 elections 0.076
(0.046)
Vote share of MHP in 1995 elections -0.033
(0.027)
SFCs in the 1991-1995 period     0.391***
(0.029)
   0.400***
(0.031) 
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population -0.024
(0.021)
-0.010
(0.019) 
Turnout -0.059
(0.029)
-0.054
(0.030)
Population size -0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
  (0.001)
Population growth rate -0.055
(0.044)
  -0.039
   (0.045)
Urbanization level -0.002
 (0.009)
-0.005
 (0.009)
Household size -0.150
(0.202)
-0.105
(0.227)
Unemployment rate 0.032
(0.087)
0.074
(0.090)
Literacy rate 0.043
(0.032)
0.039
(0.034)
Border dummy -1.672
(1.463)
-1.235
(1.493)
State of emergency dummy  2.596*
(1.347)
 2.346
(1.486)
R-Squared
                                                                          
F(12, 78)
0.7912
                         
35.29
0.7879
                           
30.62
***:significant at 1% level; **  :significant at 5% level; *    :significant at 10% level.
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Table A.6
Correlations 
between control 
variables
SFCs Urbanization Population 
growth
Kurdish 
population
State of 
emergency 
dummy
Literacy 
rate
Household 
size
Population Turnout Election 
dummy
SFCs 1
Urbanization -0.01 1
Population 
growth
0.02 0.28 1
Kurdish 
population
0.46 -0.03 0.06 1
State of 
emergency 
dummy
0.47 -0.03 0.02 0.87 1
Literacy rate -0.39 0.35 0.10 -0.69 -0.60 1
Household size 0.26 -0.24 0.02 0.65 0.53 -0.66 1
Population -0.01 0.40 0.28 0.04 -0.007 0.12 -0.09 1
Turnout -0.26 0.06 0.06 -0.37 -0.31 0.41 -0.44 -0.07 1
Election dummy 0.08 -0.18 0.11 -0.0003 0.03 -0.38 0.09 -0.04 -0.34 1
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